Supreme Court Clarifies Harm Requirement in Title VII Job Transfer Claims

 In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, (Sup. Ct., April 17, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kagan, clarified the extent to which harm must be shown in a Title VII employment discrimination case in which plaintiff alleges a discriminatory job transfer. The court said in part:

The courts below rejected the claim on the ground that the transfer did not cause Muldrow a “significant” employment disadvantage.  Other courts have used similar standards in addressing Title VII suits arising from job transfers. 

Today, we disapprove that approach. Although an employee must show some harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury satisfies a significance test.  Title VII’s text nowhere establishes that high bar....

To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.

What the transferee does not have to show, according to the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was “significant.” ... Or serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.

Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh each filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, but differing to some extent with the majority's reasoning. 

Although this case involved sex discrimination, the test would apply equally to religiously discriminatory job transfers. Wisconsin Public Radio reports on the decision.

British Court Upholds School's Ban on Student Prayer

In The King (On the application of TTT) v. Michaela Community Schools Trust, (High Ct., Kings Bench, April 16, 2024), a British trial court in an 83-page opinion rejected a Muslim student's challenge to a secular secondary school's Prayer Ritual Policy (PRP) that prevented the student from using part of her lunch break to perform her Duhr prayer. The policy was adopted by the high-performing school, in which half of the students were Muslim, after prayer by some students led to divisions within the student body and to threatening social media posts.

The court said in part:

It seems to me that this is a case ... where the Claimant at the very least impliedly accepted, when she enrolled at the School, that she would be subject to restrictions on her ability to manifest her religion. She knew that the School is secular and her own evidence is that her mother wished her to go there because it was known to be strict....

... [W]hilst accepting that her belief is that she should perform Duhr during the relevant 25 minutes of the lunch break in the winter months, and that this belief falls within Article 9 [of the European Convention on Human Rights], the evidence indicates that the effect of the PRP is that Qada is available to mitigate the failure to pray within the allotted window....

... [B]alancing the adverse effects of the PRP on the rights of Muslim pupils at the School with the aims of the PRP and the extent to which it is likely to achieve those aims, I have concluded that the latter outweighs the former and that the PRP is proportionate....

The court also rejected the claim that the prayer policy violated Britain's Equality Act. The court also issued a press release summarizing the decision. The Guardian reports on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

House Brands Palestinian Slogan as Antisemitic

Yesterday the U.S. House of Representatives by a vote of 377-44 adopted House Resolution 883 (full text) stating that the slogan, "from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free'" is antisemitic. After 29 "Whereas" clauses, the Resolution reads:

That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

(1) the slogan, “from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free”, is outrightly antisemitic and must be strongly condemned; 

(2) this slogan is divisive and does a disservice to Israelis, Palestinians, and all those in the region who seek peace;

(3) this slogan rejects calls for peace, stability, and safety in the region;

(4) this slogan perpetuates hatred against the State of Israel and the Jewish people; and

(5) anyone who calls for the eradication of Israel and the Jewish people are antisemitic and must always be condemned.

Ohio Court Issues TRO Against Bill Barring Gender-Affirming Care for Minors and Transgender Women on Sports Teams

 In Moe v. Yost, (OH Com. Pl., April 16, 2024), an Ohio state trial court issued a 14-day temporary restraining order preventing the state from enforcing House Bill 68 which enacted the Saving Ohio Adolescents from Experimentation (SAFE) Act barring gender transition services for minors and the Save Women's Sports Act that barred transgender women from competing on women's sports teams. (See prior posting.) The bill was set to take effect on April 24. The court concluded that the bill likely violates the provision in the Ohio Constitution that states: "No bill shall contain more than one subject..." The ACLU says that it "will continue the litigation to ultimately obtain a permanent injunction on behalf of Ohio families whose children are at risk of losing critical life-saving medical care." National Review reports on the decision.

Denial of Religious Exemption from Vaccine Mandate Upheld

 In Matter of Ferrelli v State of New York, (App. Div., April 16, 2024), a New York state appellate court upheld the denial of religious exemptions from the Covid vaccine mandate imposed for employment in the New York court system, The court held that the mandate was a neutral law of general applicability and thus was subject only to rational basis review. The court went on:

Marie Zweig, submitted her initial religious exemption application asserting that because of her Christian belief in the sanctity of life, she could not "in good conscience receive or benefit from the use of vaccines that are either tested on or produced using human cell lines derived from voluntarily aborted fetuses." On the supplemental form, Zweig acknowledged that she took over-the-counter medicines and would continue to do so, stating that she had "no knowledge that they were originally developed with the use of cell lines from aborted fetuses and [she] [has] determined that [she] can take them in good conscience" because "they were developed and approved long before they were tested on fetal cell lines." Respondents denied Zweig a religious exemption on the grounds that she failed to set forth a sincerely held religious belief....

... While reasonable people may disagree, upon review of Ms. Zweig's application, this Court cannot conclude that respondents' determination to deny her a religious exemption was so irrational as to be arbitrary and capricious....

5th Circuit Denies Further Relief to Native American Church Objecting to Park Modifications

As previously reported, last year a Texas federal district court held that members of the Lipam-Apache Native American Church should be given access for religious services to a point on the San Antonio River which is a Sacred Site for them.  The court refused to grant plaintiffs' request that the proposed improvements to the park in which the Sacred Site is located be limited so that the spiritual ecology of the Sacred Area would be preserved by minimizing tree removal and allowing cormorants to nest. Plaintiffs appealed the injunction denials.  In Perez v. City of San Antonio, (5th Cir., April 11, 2024), the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. Rejecting appellants' claim under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the court said in part:

In analyzing Appellants’ contention that the destruction of the tree canopies, where cormorants nest, and the driving away of the cormorants themselves will burden their religions, we consider whether the presupposed burden is real and significant....

Appellants continue to have virtually unlimited access to the Park for religious and cultural purposes. Appellants’ reverence of the cormorants as sacred genesis creatures from the Sacred Area is not implicated here because the City’s rookery management program does not directly dictate or regulate the cormorants’ nesting habits, migration, or Park visitation. For example, the record shows that, regardless of the rookery management program, no cormorants, due to their migration patterns, inhabit the area for extended periods of time each year. Moreover, the City’s rookery management program does not substantially burden Appellants’ religious beliefs because cormorants can still nest elsewhere in the 343-acre Park or nearby. The deterrent activities are deployed only within the two-acre Project Area and only to persuade the birds to nest elsewhere....

The record indicates that various areas of the Park “become nearly unusable for 10 months of the year due to the bird density/habitat.”...

 [T]he City’s tree removal plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the City’s compelling governmental interest of making the Project Area safe for visitors to the Park....

Appellants assert that the City’s plan violates the religious-service protections provision of the Texas Constitution....

Even accepting that the “relatively new provision bars any government action that prohibits or limits religious services,” Appellants do not sufficiently brief the question of whether a compelled “preservation of spiritual ecology” was envisioned in the statute’s definition of a “religious service” protected from state sanctioned prohibitions or limitations.

Judge Higginson dissented in part, contending that the city should have done more to accommodate plaintiffs as to tree removal and anti-nesting matters.

Apaches Seek Review of Their RFRA Claim by 29-Judge Panel

As previously reported, last month the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, by a vote of 6-5, refused to enjoin the government from transferring to a copper mining company federally-owned forest land that is of significant spiritual value to members of the Western Apache tribes. The land sits on the third largest deposit of copper ore in the world. The case generated six separate opinions spanning 241 pages which created separate majority alignments on different aspects of the interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Yesterday, plaintiffs filed a petition (full text) seeking review by a panel of all 29 judges on the 9th Circuit. The petition states in part:

If any case warrants full-court review, it is this one—where one en banc panel has overruled another, this Court’s judges are split 6-6, and a fractured decision has contradicted Supreme Court precedent on a question of existential importance to Native Americans. That question is whether the government “substantially burdens” religious exercise when it physically destroys a Native American sacred site, ending religious exercise forever. And the answer is plain: yes.

Becket Fund for Religious Liberty issued a press release announcing the filing.

Supreme Court Limits Scope of Injunction Against Idaho's Gender-Affirming Treatment Ban

In Labrador v. Poe, (Sup. Ct., April 15, 2024), the U.S. Supreme Court, in a case generating three separate opinions, but no opinion for the court, discussed three important issues-- the increasing number of cases on the Court's Emergency Docket (sometimes called its "Shadow Docket"); the increasing number of statewide or nationwide injunctions (sometimes called "Universal Injunctions") issued by federal district courts; and the constitutionality of bans on gender-affirming health care for minors. Last December, an Idaho federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the Idaho Attorney General and a county prosecutor from enforcing the state's recently enacted Vulnerable Child Protections Act against anyone. It concluded that the ban likely violated the equal protection clause and plaintiffs' parental rights to make medical decisions for their children. (See prior posting.) One reason given by the district court for issuing a statewide injunction was that plaintiffs, to maintain their privacy, were proceeding using pseudonyms, and it would be difficult to fashion an order applying only to plaintiffs without compromising their anonymity. The 9th Circuit issued a brief order affirming the district court.

In the petition filed with the Supreme Court, the state did not contest the granting of an injunction limited to the plaintiffs' obtaining gender-affirming drug treatments for their children. It only challenged the breadth of the district court's preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court, without issuing an opinion for the majority, stayed the district court's order "except as to the provision to the plaintiffs of the treatments they sought."   Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, issued a concurring opinion, saying in part:

The district court issued this sweeping relief even though, by its own admission, the plaintiffs had failed to “engage” with other provisions of Idaho’s law that don’t presently affect them—including the law’s provisions prohibiting the surgical removal of children’s genitals.... In choosing such an extraordinary remedy, the district court clearly strayed from equity’s traditional bounds.

Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Barrett, filed a concurring opinion, saying in part:

Traditionally, one important factor when this Court decides an emergency application involving a new law is likelihood of success on the merits.  The likelihood of success on the merits factor can pose difficulty, however, because it can require the Court to assess the merits of important cases earlier and more quickly than is ordinarily preferable, and to do so without the benefit of full merits briefing and oral argument.  But when resolving emergency applications involving significant new laws, this Court often cannot avoid that difficulty. It is not ideal, but it is reality. Given that reality, the Court must then determine the best processes for analyzing likelihood of success on the merits in emergency cases.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

This case presents numerous reasons for exercising restraint.  As explained in Part I below, the State of Idaho’s emergency application asks us to override the decisions of two lower courts based on an issue not clearly implicated and under circumstances where the State does not contest that its law should remain enjoined as likely unconstitutional, at least as applied to the plaintiffs.  As described in Part II, even if today’s application actually involved a “universal injunction,” the emergency docket would not be the place to address the open and challenging questions that that issue raises.

Justice Kagan dissented, without opinion. Chief Justice Roberts did not indicate how he voted.

SCOTUSblog reports at greater length on the opinions.

Louisiana Supreme Court: Revival of Barred Sex Abuse Claims Violates Priest's Rights Under State Constitution

 In Bienvenu v. Defendant 1, (LA Sup. Ct., March 22, 2024), the Louisiana Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that a 2021 Louisiana statute that revived child sex abuse claims that had previously been time barred violates the Louisiana Constitution. The statute gave victims a 3-year window to file claims. The court said in part:

Essentially, plaintiffs alleged they were sexually molested by a Roman Catholic priest at various times between 1971 and 1979.   At the time of the alleged abuse, plaintiffs ranged in ages from eight to fourteen.  

Defendants responded by filing several exceptions, including a peremptory exception of prescription, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were subject to the general one-year liberative prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1)....

The definite nature of accrued prescription has been repeatedly recognized in our jurisprudence, which makes it clear that, unlike statutes of limitations at common law, under civilian principles, prescriptive periods that have accrued act to extinguish the civil obligation to which they apply....

Guided by Louisiana’s civil law tradition, we decline to upend nearly a half of a century’s jurisprudence that recognizes the unique nature of vested rights associated with liberative prescription, which inure to the benefit of both plaintiffs (protecting an accrued cause of action) and defendants (protecting a defense of accrued liberative prescription).  Therefore, despite the sickening  and despicable factual allegations in this case, we must conclude that La. R.S. 9:2800.9, as amended by the revival provisions, cannot be retroactively applied to revive plaintiffs’ prescribed causes of action.  To find otherwise would divest defendants of their vested right to plead prescription in violation of Art. I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution.

However the court remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the one-year prescriptive period had tolled.

Justice Crichton filed a concurring opinion, as did Justice Griffin.

Chief Justice Weimer dissented, saying in part:

Given Louisiana’s legitimate interest in protecting its citizens who were sexually abused as minors and in providing them with the ability to seek redress in the courts, and the narrowly tailored nature of the relief provided–the legislation revives, for a short period of time, for a narrow category of tort victims, actions otherwise prescribed–I would find that the revival provision is consistent with the due process guarantee.  Under the due process clause, no rights–not even fundamental ones–are absolute.  The due process clause simply offers protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action by the government.  The revival provision at issue is not arbitrary (in fact, in this case it is arguable that the “arbitrary and unreasonable” conduct was the alleged sexual abuse perpetrated upon children by those in society who were placed in positions of authority).  And, the provision has been demonstrated to have a substantial relationship to public safety, morals and welfare.

Justice Crain also filed a dissenting opinion. Justice McCallum dissented without opinion.

Balls and Strikes reported on the decision. [Thanks to Scott Mange for the lead.]

European Court: Failure To Consider Antisemitic Nature of Threats Violated Woman's Rights Under European Convention

In Allouche v. France, (ECHR, April 11, 2024) (full text in French), the European Court of Human Rights in a Chamber Judgment awarded damages of 15,000 Euros plus costs and expenses to a Jewish woman for violation of her right to respect for her private life. As explained by the Court in an English language summary:

Criminal proceedings were conducted following a complaint lodged by the applicant concerning antisemitic insults and threats she had received by email from B....

The applicant’s complaint concerned the fact that the authorities, which had failed to take into account the antisemitic aspect of the offender’s remarks, had failed to provide her with effective protection against antisemitic acts of violence, threats and insults. Some of B.’s statements had been extremely violent, had contained direct threats and had been directed at the applicant as a member of the Jewish community.

The Court reiterated that the national authorities had a duty to implement an appropriate legal framework to protect against discriminatory acts and to take all reasonable steps to determine whether there had been any racist or, more broadly, discriminatory motive for the impugned acts.... Violent incidents with allegedly discriminatory motives, in particular racist motives, should not be treated on an equal footing with offences lacking such motives....

In the light of the above considerations, the domestic authorities had disregarded their positive obligations under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, which had consisted in providing the applicant with effective and adequate criminal-law protection against the statements made by the offender. The authorities’ failure to take into account the antisemitic component of the present case had undermined their ability to provide an appropriate response.

[Thanks to Law & Religion UK for the lead.]

Recent Articles of Interest

From SSRN:

• Whittney Barth, Minimal (In)Fidelity: The Ministerial Exception in Religious Higher Education, (Forthcoming: ABA Journal of Labor and Employment Law).
• Andrew Sykes, One Nation Under God, Indivisible, with Liberty and Dignity for All: Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Use of Catholic Social Teaching in His Gay Rights Jurisprudence, (CSLR Research Paper No. #1.2024-ESS (2024)).
• Lama Abu-Odeh, Western Feminism Before and After October 7, (Georgetown University Law Center Research Paper No.___, Forthcoming, (2024)).
• Florence Ashley, Parental Rights Over Transgender Youth—Furthering a Pressing and Substantial Objective?, (Alberta Law Review, Forthcoming).
• Adam MacLeod & Mark David Hall, Foundations of the Right of Charitable Uses, (Mississippi Law Journal, Forthcoming).
• Jessica Clarke, Scrutinizing Sex, (University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming).

From SmartCILP:

• Stephanos Bibas, Judge Alito's First Amendment Vigilance on the Third Circuit, 46 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 687-702 (2023).
• Gabrielle Girgis, An Architect of Religious Liberty Doctrines for the Roberts Court, 46 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 825-844 (2023).
• Roy G. Spece, Jr., SCOTUS's Summer of 2022: Obfuscation of and Disdain for Rationality and the Traditional Personal Liberties Framework, 112 Kentucky Law Journal 55-112 (2023-2024).

Vatican Releases Declaration on Human Dignity

 On April 8, the Vatican's Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith published a Declaration on Human Dignity, “Dignitas Infinita" (full text).  An introduction to the Declaration by the Prefect of the Dicastery says in part:

The five-year course of the text’s preparation helps us to understand that the document before us reflects the gravity and centrality of the theme of dignity in Christian thought. The text required a considerable process of maturation to arrive at the final version that we have published today.

In its initial three sections, the Declaration recalls fundamental principles and theoretical premises, with the goal of offering important clarifications that can help avoid frequent confusion that surrounds the use of the term “dignity.” The fourth section presents some current and problematic situations in which the immense and inalienable dignity due to every human being is not sufficiently recognized. The Church sees the condemnation of these grave and current violations of human dignity as a necessary measure, for she sustains the deep conviction that we cannot separate faith from the defense of human dignity, evangelization from the promotion of a dignified life, and spirituality from a commitment to the dignity of every human being.

The items described at length in the fourth section as "grave violations of human dignity" are the drama of poverty, war, travail of migrants, human trafficking, sexual abuse, violence against women, abortion, surrogacy, euthanasia and assisted suicide, marginalization of people with disabilities, gender theory, sex change and digital violence. The document's discussion of gender identity has perhaps created the most controversy. The Document says in part:

It needs to be emphasized that ‘biological sex and the socio-cultural role of sex (gender) can be distinguished but not separated.’” Therefore, all attempts to obscure reference to the ineliminable sexual difference between man and woman are to be rejected: “We cannot separate the masculine and the feminine from God’s work of creation, which is prior to all our decisions and experiences, and where biological elements exist which are impossible to ignore.” Only by acknowledging and accepting this difference in reciprocity can each person fully discover themselves, their dignity, and their identity....

It follows that any sex-change intervention, as a rule, risks threatening the unique dignity the person has received from the moment of conception. This is not to exclude the possibility that a person with genital abnormalities that are already evident at birth or that develop later may choose to receive the assistance of healthcare professionals to resolve these abnormalities. However, in this case, such a medical procedure would not constitute a sex change in the sense intended here.

Asked at a Press Gaggle (full text) about President Biden's reaction to the Declaration, the White House Press Secretary said that it was not the President's role "to litigate internal church policy," but that the President has been clear that it is important to have protections for the transgender community and the broader LGBTQ+ community. 

Vox reports at greater length on the Vatican document.

Florida Appellate Court Disqualifies Trial Judge from Hearing Custody Case Involving Transgender Child

 In H.S., v. Department of Children and Families, (FL App., April 3, 2024), a Florida appellate court in a 2-1 decision ordered a trial judge to recuse herself from hearing a case in which a father is challenging the Florida Department of Children and Families' removal of a child from the father's custody. DCF contends that the father, who is a Christian minister and youth pastor, is abusive toward the child because he does not support the child's gender transition. The appeals court concluded that:

Here, the father's fear that he cannot receive a fair and impartial hearing before the trial judge is well-grounded and objectively reasonable....

To an objectively reasonable person, the trial judge's pre-hearing remarks were antagonistic to the father and his right to direct the child's upbringing and moral or religious training. Those remarks when taken together—referring to the child by female pseudonyms, telling the child that "you are one smart, strong[,] [t]ogether, young lady," and to "[c]hin up, sister"—implied a foregone conclusion, before hearing the father's motion, that the trial judge was supportive of the child's gender transition before adulthood and opposed to the father's reliance upon his moral or religious beliefs to otherwise direct the child's upbringing.

Furthermore, the trial judge's in-camera interaction with the child went beyond mere attempts to establish a rapport with the child.,,, [T]he trial judge verbally expressed an inclination—again, before hearing the father's motion—to order the father to submit to "professional help," "counseling," or "guidance" from DCF in an effort to change his moral or religious beliefs.

Judge May dissented, saying in part:

Here, the trial judge's attempt to speak with a child in a manner that put the child at ease does not demonstrate the judge's predisposition of the pending issue. In fact, trial judges often take special care to speak with children to ensure they are comfortable in court proceedings; the decision to do so is within a trial judge's discretion.

Volokh Conspiracy has more on the case.

8th Circuit Hears Oral Arguments on Employee's Religious Discrimination Claim Over Objection To LGBTQ+ Display Online

The U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals on Tuesday heard oral arguments in Snyder v. Arconic Corp. (Audio of full oral arguments.) In the case, an Iowa federal district court in Snyder v. Arconic Corp., (SD IA, Aug. 31, 2023), dismissed a Title VII religious discrimination claim brought by an employee who was fired for placing a post on the company's intranet objecting to a rainbow-colored heart on the company's intranet publicizing a support group for LGBTQ+ employees. The employee's post read:  "Its a (sic.) abomination to God. Rainbow is not meant to be displayed as a sign for sexual gender." He contended that the post was religiously motivated. The district court held that the employee had not shown a conflict between his religious practices and the company's diversity policy. Thomas More Society issued a press release announcing the oral arguments.

Uganda's Constitutional Court Upholds Most of Its Anti-Homosexuality Act

In Odoi v. Attorney General, (Const. Ct. Uganda, April 3, 2023), the Constitutional Court of Uganda in a 203-page opinion upheld most of the Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act 2023. The Act imposes a life imprisonment sentence for anyone who engages in a homosexual act, and the death penalty for aggravated homosexuality which in general is defined as engaging in a homosexual act with various types of vulnerable persons. However, the court struck down four sections of the Act: §3(2)(c) which defines aggravated homosexuality as including the situation in which the victim contracts a terminal illness as a result of the sexual act; §9 and §11(2)(d) which criminalize knowingly allowing premises to be used or leased out for homosexuality or activities encouraging it, and §14 which imposes a duty to report homosexuality even by individuals who would normally be prevented by privilege from reporting. In a press release, the Court summarized the decision in part as follows:

In coming to its decision, the Constitutional Court considered the following: 

... 2. The absence of consensus at the global level regarding non-discrimination based sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics (SOGIESC)....

3. The conflict in international human rights law between upholding a universal understanding of human rights and respecting the diversity and freedom of human cultures.... 

4. The conflict between individuals’ right to self-determination, self-perception and bodily autonomy, on the one hand; and the communal or societal right to social, political and cultural self-determination.... 

5. The recent developments in the human rights jurisprudence including the decision of the US Supreme Court in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organisation, No. 19-1392, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), where the Court considered the nation’s history and traditions, as well as the dictates of democracy and rule of law, to over-rule the broader right to individual autonomy. 

6. The uniqueness of Uganda’s Constitution which obliges the courts of law to take into account the country’s socio-cultural norms, values and aspirations when resolving any disputes before them.  

7. The Anti-Homosexuality Act being, in general, a reflection of the sociocultural realities of the Ugandan society, and was passed by an overwhelming majority of the democratically elected representatives of the Ugandan citizens.

Louis Farrakhan's Suit Against ADL Dismissed

 In Farrakhan v. Anti-Defamation League, (SD NY, April 5, 2024), a New York federal district court dismissed defamation claims asserted by Louis Farrakhan against the Anti-Defamation League. The court describes Farrakhan's allegations:

The [complaint], which details nearly a century's worth of grievances, alleges several instances of defamation and, as against the ADL, various violations of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. At their core, plaintiffs' claims are that by repeatedly referring to plaintiffs as antisemitic, defendants have defamed them and created a chilling effect on their religious practices. Plaintiffs seek $4.8 billion in damages as well as a declaratory judgment that the term "anti-Semite" is defamatory per se and that the ADL is a quasi-governmental actor that violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin defendants from calling them antisemitic or taking any steps to urge third parties to disassociate with them.

A number of claims were dismissed on standing grounds, finding that Farrakhan did not allege concrete injuries traceable to ADL. Farrakhan's defamation claims were dismissed because Farrakhan, a public figure, did not plead actual malice. Others were dismissed because they were merely statements of opinion or Farrakhan had not alleged facts showing falsity.

Alabama Supreme Court Affirms Dismissal of Church Property Dispute

 In Sails v. Weeks, (AL Sup. Ct., April 5, 2024), the Alabama Supreme Court by a vote of 8-1, without an opinion for the majority, affirmed the dismissal of a suit challenging the use and disposal of church property. Defendants contended that plaintiffs are not members of the church and thus could not bring suit on its behalf. Justice Mendheim filed a concurring opinion, saying in part: 

[I]t is inaccurate to attribute the genesis of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine to the First Amendment. The delicacy with which courts approach church-dispute cases arose more organically from America's history of seeking to disentangle church denominations from state governance...

I believe that our invocation of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine should come from a desire to protect religious freedom rather than an unfounded fear that religious ideas might taint our civil jurisprudence....

The Sails plaintiffs argued that the heart of this dispute concerns the alleged mismanagement or misuse of church property. However, I believe that the Sails plaintiffs' property allegations are a proxy for asking the courts to decide who controls the church -- an issue our courts lack the means and expertise to decide....

... "[T]he nature of the underlying dispute" is whether the Sails plaintiffs, who stopped attending the church several years ago, are still members of the spiritual church, who are the ones that ultimately control the incorporated church and the property it holds. In short, there is no way around the fact that, in this case, a decision concerning the use of the church property implicates the spiritual church because church membership is a spiritual concern. 

Justice Sellers filed a dissenting opinion, saying in part:

Defendants ... moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, in part, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an action on behalf of Union Baptist because, they claimed, Union Baptist was no longer a recognized legal entity under Alabama law because of the official name change that occurred in 2017....

... [C]hanging the name of a corporation, amending an organizational document, or reforming a deed involves the use of our civil legal system that by its very nature is not ecclesiastical.  The issue in this case then is who has the authority to act on behalf of the organization?  And, after identifying that issue, the question then becomes whether secular courts can decide that issue or whether that decision should be left to some ecclesiastical authority?  Because we have no ecclesiastical courts with enforcement authority, I am uncertain how the issue can be decided without court intervention.